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Abstract—Download fraud is a prevalent threat in mobile App
markets, where fraudsters manipulate the number of downloads
of Apps via various cheating approaches. Purchased fake down-
loads can mislead recommendation and search algorithms and
further lead to bad user experience in App markets. In this paper,
we investigate download fraud problem based on a company’s
App Market, which is one of the most popular Android App
markets. We release a honeypot App on the App Market and
purchase fake downloads from fraudster agents to track fraud
activities in the wild. Based on our interaction with the fraudsters,
we categorize download fraud activities into three types according
to their intentions: boosting front end downloads, optimizing
App search ranking, and enhancing user acquisition&retention
rate. For the download fraud aimed at optimizing App search
ranking, we select, evaluate, and validate several features in
identifying fake downloads based on billions of download data.
To get a comprehensive understanding of download fraud, we
further gather stances of App marketers, fraudster agencies, and
market operators on download fraud. The followed analysis and
suggestions shed light on the ways to mitigate download fraud
in App markets and other social platforms. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work that investigates the download
fraud problem in mobile App markets.
Index Terms—web services, data mining, information security,
crowdsourcing
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, smart devices enable people to access various
services through mobile applications (Apps) easily. Apps are
distributed by the App markets, which are digital platforms
developed by third-party Internet companies, e.g., the Google
Play by Google, or smart device vendors such as the iOS
App Store by Apple. In App markets, users can browse Apps
with various types of contents and functions, while the App
markets make profits through distributing the paid Apps and
advertisements. According to a recent study [1], App markets
now cover more than 2 billion devices and are worth more
than $25 billion over the rapid growth all over the world.
The considerable profit leads to numerous fraud activities
targeting the factors that determine the App choices of users.
Previous studies have investigated ranking fraud [2]–[4], spam
reviews [5], [6], App removal mechanism [7] and malware
dissemination [8], [9] in App markets.
Among all fraud activities in App markets, download fraud
aims at manipulates the quantity of App downloads. Evidences
from news [10] and black market [11] indicate that download
fraud is inundant in App markets. A recent report from Datavi-
sor [12] claims that near 10% downloads&installs in mobile
marketing are fake, which causes up to $300 million loss for
app marketers in 2018. For App market itself, the injected
fake downloads would mislead the recommender system to
generate low-quality recommendation results or even disturb
the whole App market ecosystem.
In order to obtain a holistic view of download fraud ac-
tivities in App markets, we investigate them from multiple
perspectives. Different from previous works [2]–[9], where
the data are crawled from App market portals, which lack
fraudsters information and ground truth of fraud activities, we
dive deeper and explore the download fraud activities inside
a company’s App Market, which is one of the most popular
Android App markets in the world [13]. With access to the
billions of server-side download data, we aim to answer the
following research questions:
• RQ1: What are the types of download fraud activities in
the App market?
• RQ2: How to identify the download fraud activities?
• RQ3: How to mitigate the download fraud in App mar-
kets?
To answer RQ1, we set up a honeypot App and disguise as
an App marketer to purchase fake downloads from fraudster
agencies. Integrating the information from the server-side
download log and agencies, we find three major types of
download fraud activities in App markets with different goals.
For RQ2, we find a solid method to acquire the ground
truth of download fraud activities. Then we design a number
of features and train machine learning models to identify fake
downloads and suspicious Apps involved in download fraud
campaigns.
For the third research question, we interview three distinct
parties (App marketers, fraudster agencies, and market opera-
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tors) related to App download fraud activities. Based on their
stances and our analysis, we offer several guidance and sugges-
tions for preventing the download fraud from the perspectives
across security, App market operation, and advertisement.
In summary, our work makes three major contributions:
• We investigate and categorize the download fraud activi-
ties in three different types under an industrial setting.
To the best of our knowledge, it is the first work to
conduct comprehensive investigations on download fraud
in mobile App markets. (Section III.)
• We propose new features as well as adapting features
from previous works in identifying fake downloads. The
experiment on a large scale industrial dataset extracts a
number of informative features and discover meaningful
patterns of fraud activities. (Section IV.)
• We interview and present the stances of three parties
involved in download fraud activities, as well as our
suggestions on mitigating download fraud and building
a better App market ecosystem. (Section V.)
II. RELATED WORK
Our work lies on three major research topics: App markets
security, click fraud detection, and black market investigation.
Previous works have investigated various kinds of security
issues in App markets. Chen [8] and Rahman [9] analyzed
malware dissemination in Google Play. Zhu [3] and Chen
[4] studied the suspicious Apps involved in search ranking
in iOS App Store. Li et al. [6] delved crowdsourced spam
reviews in both Google Play and iOS App Store. Potharaju et
al. [14] gave a longitudinal analysis of Apps in Google Play
and provided suggestions on detecting search ranking fraud.
According to [15], Google Play does not eliminate all fake
downloads. Moreover, few previous works have investigated
this problem either. It is mainly due to the lack of the ground
truth of fraud activities. The data crawled from the front end,
which has limited information, also hinders previous work for
a comprehensive study on the download fraud. In this work,
with server-side data and device vendor information as the
ground truth, we could take a holistic approach to probe the
download fraud in App market.
The outcome of download fraud is similar to click fraud,
which is a type of fraud that occurs in pay-per-click online
advertising [16]. Click fraudsters usually inject fake clicks to
target URLs using click bots and steal money from advertisers.
To detect click fraud, Pearce et al. [16] employed peer-
to-peer measurements, command-and-control telemetry, and
contemporaneous click data to analyze click fraud on botnets.
Oentaryo et al. [17] devised various temporal and statistical
patterns to detect click fraud in online advertising. Cao et al.
[18] leveraged behavior features and click patterns to detect
spam URL sharing. The download fraud we investigated in this
paper is more complicated than click fraud (i.e., mixed with
human and bot activities). Inspired by the click fraud detection
works mentioned above, we propose to model the download
fraud activities in a multiview and feature-based perspective.
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Fig. 1: The workflow of how we set up the honeypot and
track fraud activities. We disguise as an App marketer and
purchase fake downloads from fraudster agencies who plan
and distribute downloads injection tasks to different download
farms. The assigned farms inject fake downloads to our
honeypot App in the App market. We monitor and analyze
the fraud activities from the server-side log.
For the black markets investigation, several works [19]–[22]
have probed the crowdsourcing websites and devised machine
learning approaches to detect crowdturfing campaigns and
crowd workers. Other works like [23] inspected the transac-
tions over trading App reviews and [24] investigated the crowd
fraud in Internet advertisement. However, seldom previous
work has studied the black markets targeting download fraud.
Like [25]–[27], we launch a honeypot App in App market
to acquire reliable ground truth of download fraud activities.
Moreover, we infiltrate into the black market and reap useful
information from fraudsters to help our analysis.
III. RQ1: DOWNLOAD FRAUD TYPES
We set up a honeypot App and infiltrate into the black
market to explore the fine-grained download fraud types. Some
terminologies used throughout this paper are summarized as
follows.
• Fraudster Agency is a proxy in black market that
connects download farms with their customers (i.e., app
marketers and developers). It is usually in the form of an
App promotion website.
• Download Farm (also known as Click Farm) is a
physical location that conducts fake download injection
service. Download farm is usually composed of numerous
real mobile devices or device simulators, we call them the
download bots [12].
• App Store Optimization (ASO) is a process that applies
a set of optimization policies to Apps in order to boost
App search ranking in App market.
• Crowdturfing is the campaign initialized by App mar-
keters. Crowd workers obtain monetary rewards in ex-
change for performing simple “tasks” inside Apps that
go against accepted user policies [19].
TABLE I: Summary of three download fraud types. They have different goals and employ different attacking approaches.
Fraud Type Goal Target Approach Price(USD/10k)
Level
of Threat
Detection
Difficulty
1 Boosting front end downloads Front end Automated scripts 5 Low Easy
2 Optimizing App search ranking Back end Download bots 70 High Hard
3 Enhancing user acquisition & retention rate App Crowd workers 1400 Low Very hard
TABLE II: Comparison between purchased fake downloads injection services on our honeypot App. Portal website: download
comes from App market portal website. Update: download comes from updating the App. Null: no download source record.
Farm Name Access via #Downloads Source Price(USD/10k) IP Address Device ID Duration(hours) Date
Farm 1 Website 10,000 Portal site 4 Distinct None 12 06/06/2018
Farm 2 Taobao 15,000 Update 6 Distinct Normal 2 07/31/2018
Farm 3 QQ 10,000 Null 6 Distinct Abnormal 0.2 08/05/2018
Farm 4 Website 20,000 Portal site 3 Distinct Abnormal 1 09/15/2018
A. Setting Up the Honeypot
Suspicious Apps involved in massive download fraud are
easy to detect when we examine their download traffics.
However, it is difficult to identify whether each download of
an App is fake or not, since fake downloads usually mix with
the legitimate ones. Inspired by setting honeypots in Twitter
[25] and Facebook [26] to acquire the ground truth of fraud
activities, we also place a standalone honeypot App 1 in the
company’s App market. We track the activities of download
fraudsters from the server-side log, and further dissect their
working mechanism along with the information probed from
fraudsters.
Figure 1 illustrates our honeypot setting workflow. Since
most of the fraudsters are in the black market, we connect
with the fraudster agencies found by searching keywords
such as App promotion, App store optimization and buy App
downloads on search engines. As Table II shows, we finally
contact with fraudster agencies via their websites, e-commerce
platforms like Taobao, or online chatting services like QQ.
To make sure the honeypot App does not influence the App
market regular operation, we set the honeypot App to be inac-
cessible by users in the App market. Therefore, the server log
only has the records of purchased fake downloads. Meanwhile,
we are able to monitor various attributes of download fraud
activities given access to the server-side data.
After setting up the honeypot, we purchase four download
injection services where each of them is asked to inject 10k-
20k fake downloads to our honeypot App separately. We select
four distinct periods among four months in 2018 to avoid
potential bias.
B. Fraud Types
During communicating with fraudster agencies, we observe
various kinds of fake downloads injection service. Based on
this, we try to categorize those frauds under a unified scheme
1The released honeypot App is a gaming App which is the most frequently
purchased App according to fraudster agencies.
and expect a full picture of download fraud activities. Integrat-
ing the information from fraudster agencies and our server-side
observation, we classify download fraud activities into three
major types according to their goals. Table I summarizes their
characteristics.
1) Boosting Front End Downloads: This type of fraud
targets at increasing specific App’s download times displayed
at the App market web portal and mobile client (a.k.a. front
end), which could be tracked by third-party App analytics
companies. The displayed download count is a significant
indicator for App analytics companies to provide App quality
assessments. Thus, a boost in the front end downloads dis-
play could help the App gain a better rating. According to
fraudster agencies, such fraud is relatively an easy task that
could be implemented by automated scripts. Download farms
deploy similar injecting techniques in injecting this type of
downloads. Such fake downloads are at low cost compared to
other two types of fake downloads and only take effect at the
front end.
From the server-side log, we find that all purchased fake
downloads to the honeypot App fall into this category. Table
II shows the main attributes of four purchased download
injection services. We could see that fake downloads injected
by four farms all have distinct IP addresses but vary in
downloading source and device ID. Regular downloads usually
come from App market clients on smart devices, while Farm
1 and Farm 4 both inject fake downloads from the App
market portal website. The mechanism is simply clicking the
honeypot App downloading URL listed at the App market
portal website. Moreover, they both fail to generate valid
device IDs. Farm 2 can simulate the device ID information,
but it injects the fake downloads via repeatedly updating the
honeypot App, which is not an ordinary behavior.
2) Optimizing App Search Ranking: In App markets,
users’ search results or App recommendation results will be
displayed as lists of ordered Apps to the users. Apps are ranked
according to an elaborate algorithm where the amount of App
downloads is a crucial feature. The Apps listed at the top
of the list are supposed to be the most related target, and
have a higher chance to be viewed and further downloaded by
users. Thus, boosting an App’s ranking order could increase
App discovery and organic downloads. However, according to
our investigation, the first type of download fraud targeting
the front end display has little effect on the company’s App
ranking system. To mislead the App ranking system and
thereby increase the app exposure rate, the second type of
download fraud injects more “genuine” downloads to server
logs. Specifically, download farms employ download bots with
more advanced attacking techniques to inject fake downloads.
Those camouflaged downloads are usually considered as gen-
uine downloads.
From the information probed from fraudster agencies, in-
jecting legitimate-like fake downloads is usually a part of
App Store Optimization service, and it would cost at least
300 US Dollars for our honeypot App. Purchasing such ASO
service to our honeypot App incurs a large budget and is a
time-consuming process. Meanwhile, we are informed that all
injected downloads come from download bots, which are not
real devices and may contain irregular device vendor flags. To
examine the hypothesis, we make use of the device vendor
flag and experiment with server-side logs. More details are
discussed in Section IV.
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Fig. 2: The distribution of (a) categories of Apps that solicit
crowdturfing services; (b) post-install crowd tasks requiring
user engagement.
3) Enhancing User Acquisition & Retention Rate: While
the first two types of download fraud aim at cheating the
App market with fake App downloads, the last type is of
large difference, which focuses on the App itself. Its goal is
to increase or keep user acquisition & retention rate mostly
for business purposes, such as achieving the product KPIs to
attract investments. This type of fraud is more complex and
adopts crowdturfing attack to manipulate target Apps.
The crowdsourcing tasks are commonly published on
crowdsourcing websites (a.k.a. App trial platforms). Any user
with a smart device can register as a crowd worker on the
website and seek the task they would like to do. After the
required task is done, the platform would pay crowd workers
monetary reward. Since most fraud activities of this type are
executed inside the Apps, and it produces only a few amounts
of new downloads, its threat to App markets is much lower
than the first two types of fraud. From App market server-side
log, such download fraud activities are extremely difficult to
track, since the behavior of crowd workers inside App market
is almost the same as regular users.
To get a sense of this type of fraud, we crawl information
from sixteen App trial platforms in China. Figure 2 sum-
marizes the collected information. Figure 2a indicates that
more than half of the plagiarism Apps are Finance and Game
Apps because they can monetize users. The Apps in Tools
usually integrate with many mobile advertisements, which
makes Tools become the leading category purchasing such
fraud service. According to Figure 2b, Registration and Daily
signing in correspond to user acquisition and retention. The
post-install tasks like reposting news, adding bank accounts,
and playing games are personalized requirement from App
marketers, which are related to KPIs. The price of the crowd-
turfing task depends on its complexity. In general, its average
cost is much higher than the first two types of download fraud.
IV. RQ2: IDENTIFYING FAKE DOWNLOADS
Setting up honeypot helps us capture the evidence of the
first type of download fraud activity, and further figure out the
multiple facets behind the fake downloads. According to our
analysis in Section III:
• The records of the fake downloads injected by the first
type of download fraud have distinct differences from
other download records. Those fake downloads could be
easily determined and filtered with the Source and Device
ID information, as shown in Table II.
• The third type of download fraud involves multiple
factors across the App markets. We will discuss the
approaches to mitigate it along with the stances from
different parties in App market ecosystem in Section V.
For the second type of fraud, the information we obtained
from the download agencies and the third-party reports in-
dicates that it is the most prevalent download fraud type in
mobile App markets [4], [13], [15]. However, previous works
are unable to address the problem from a holistic view due
to the data limitation and lack of ground truth [3], [4]. For
this reason, with the access to server-side data, we attempt
to discover useful features that could spot the bot-generated
downloads, and give an in-depth analysis of the second type
of download fraud in this section.
A. Ground Truth & Data Collection
According to the fraudster agencies, the second type of
download fraud is executed by bots controlled by download
farms. However, those bots are not able to simulate device IDs
produced by smartphone vendors. Also knowing that more
than 90% of total App downloads in the company’s App
Market are from smartphones produced by the company, a
download record from a non-vendor device is very suspicious.
Therefore, we could utilize the vendor flag in the download
logs as the ground truth to help us identify the bot activities.
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Fig. 3: Selected features of a unique download record from
server log. The relative importance is calculated according to
Gini Index. New device? or New App? represents whether the
App or device is released or first activated within one week
of the record timestamp.
We define the negative download record (normal down-
load) as the download record of vendor-verified device. We
consider App with more than 50% of downloads from non-
vendor devices during the experiment period as the suspicious
App involved in download fraud activities. The normal Apps
are Apps whose downloads are all originated from vendor-
verified devices. Then, all download records of the suspicious
Apps during the experiment period are regarded as positive
download records (suspicious downloads). By doing so, we
could ensure that positive samples contain bot records and
extensive data for a valid study.
By sampling over billions of server-side download records
in ten random days among six months, we could conduct
an accurate quantitative analysis without potential bias. Our
final experiment dataset includes around one million positive
records and nine million negative records, which covers more
than half a million Apps. We strictly obey the privacy pro-
tection policies when collecting the data. All device IDs and
IP addresses are encrypted with hash codes. Therefore, the
dataset contains no personal information and is completely
anonymous.
B. Feature Selection & Validation
With the ground truth data, we aim to discover features
that could identify fake downloads efficiently. Moreover, we
would like to validate the effectiveness of features proposed by
the state-of-the-art works. To facilitate future analysis under
the industrial environment, the selected features should be
interpretable as well. According to the intuition above, we
decide to design features based on server-side data, previous
works, and information from fraudster agencies.
Each record in the download log has the metadata of
one download action (e.g., device ID, App ID, timestamp).
We could query more metadata and statistical metrics of
devices and Apps from other server-side logs via device ID
and App ID. According to previous work modeling behavior
anomalies [18], [28], we harness the statistical metrics such as
#Avg.&Total downloads of all Apps to model general down-
load behavior and #Avg.&Max. downloads/hour to model the
burst in download traffics. Besides behavior features, we also
select App metadata, like App category, and App rating which
probably can distinguish suspicious Apps from regular ones
[3], [5]. According to prior works on click fraud detection
[17], bots inside the same group are supposed to share the
same IP address. Thus, we use #Max.&Avg. downloads/IP to
model it.
From the download farms, we are informed that the second
type of download fraud usually targets new Apps and could
simulate regular user behavior like searching and viewing
Apps before hitting the download button. Along with other
server-side data which is supposed to be as signals of bot
activities (search, view, download from clients), we add New
Features shown in Figure 3.
To evaluate the capability of selected features in identifying
fake downloads, we use Gini Impurity to calculate feature
importance [29]. Figure 3 shows the normalized relative im-
portance of the selected features. From the feature importance
ranking, we have the following observations and conclusions:
• The most informative feature New device? indicates that
download bots usually reset their device IDs after one
download action. Because it is difficult to determine the
suspiciousness of a new device with no history record.
• App rating and App category are two other top infor-
mative features. It reveals that the Apps involved in
download fraud activities are different in attributes from
regular Apps. More details are discussed in Section IV-C.
• Many Apps involved with download fraud are new re-
leased Apps. It reflects the intention of App marketers to
purchase fake downloads to facilitate their App launching.
• Except for the first device feature, most of the App
download statistics features reveal more signals than
device behavior features in identifying fake downloads.
• App statistics like installations, views, searched times,
and client downloads help distinguish the abnormal traf-
fics. It validates our assumptions when selecting those
features.
• Most of the device behavioral features and IP-based
features have little contribution to the classification task.
It contradicts to our early assumptions, showing that
the download bots can indeed simulate regular users’
behavior very well, which is similar to the observation
on social spambots in previous study [30].
• The total searching times of bots are similar to regular
users. It indicates that bots could emulate the searching
behavior of regular users. Meanwhile, suspicious Apps
have higher searched times than regular Apps. Both of
them reflect that the fraudsters engaged in the second
type of download fraud aim to manipulate the app search
ranking in an imperceptible way.
To further validate the performance of selected features,
we feed different types of features into XGBoost which is
an efficient tree boosting based classifier [31] and test them
on a separated validation dataset collected on January 2019.
Table III shows the testing result. We note that the device
features set could identify more fake downloads, but it has
a lower precision, which means it classifies more regular
downloads as fake. A high false positive rate will make the
legitimate app marketers compromise mobile App markets,
and may further reduce the markets’ revenue. Though the
features proposed by us cannot beat the performance of
previous features, aggregating all features together could hit
100% among all metrics. It validates the rationale behind our
feature selection.
TABLE III: Testing results of different types of features with
XGBoost.
Feature Type Precision Recall F1 AUC Accuracy
Device 0.955 0.988 0.963 0.977 0.992
App 0.978 0.972 0.976 0.965 0.993
New 0.974 0.940 0.951 0.969 0.993
Previous 0.974 0.977 0.975 0.996 0.987
All 0.994 0.992 0.993 0.998 0.997
C. Comparative Analysis
To gain a more in-depth insight into the second type of
download fraud, we conduct a comparative analysis between
fraud bots/Apps and regular users/Apps with the identified fake
downloads and suspicious Apps.
With the XGBoost classifier above, we have identified more
than one hundred suspicious Apps among all apps in the
company’s App Market from June 2018 to December 2018.
Figure 4a shows the category distribution of fraud Apps
comparing with the overall category distribution among all
Apps across the App market. Notably, Finance and Game Apps
account for more than half of the suspicious Apps, while these
two kinds of Apps only take up to 15% among all Apps in
the App market. We consider Game and Finance Apps have
more potential in monetizing users, which makes a significant
amount of profit. This profit leads to the interests in soliciting
download fraud campaigns. The observation is consistent with
information probed from fraudster agencies.
As a critical metric in App market, App rating also attracts
our great interest. Fig 4b shows the rating distribution of
suspicious Apps comparing with normal Apps across the App
market. Normal Apps and suspicious Apps have different
rating distributions. The mode and mean of normal App ratings
are both in the range 2-3 and 3-4, while the mode and mean
value of suspicious Apps are in 4-5. A significant portion of
the extreme positive ratings of suspicious Apps validates the
conclusion of Zhu et al. on ranking fraud detection [3]. It
demonstrates that download fraud usually comes with rating
manipulation, and they aim to fool the App ranking algorithms
via manipulating App downloads and ratings.
In the perspective of the download activities, we plot the
normalized hourly download times of fake downloads and
normal downloads in Figure 4c. Intuitively, regular users
have less activity during the resting time, so there is seldom
downloads occur during this period. On the other hand, bots
do not have resting time, and their download activities are
relatively steady throughout the day. The different distribution
further proves that fake downloads of the second fraud type
are generated by bots.
There are two more interesting phenomenons we find while
analyzing the suspicious Apps. The first one is that not all
anomalies are fraudulent. We find some Apps with downloads
burst during a short period are actual at their promotion phases.
From Google Trends2, the App searching trends are consistent
with their downloads traffic. It indicates that the traffic spikes
may be made by other promotion channels outside App
markets. A similar phenomenon has been observed in user-
review social networks as well [32]. Another observation is
that the categories suffering from download fraud vary with
time. For example, a large amount of sports betting Apps
involved in download fraud are identified during the 2018
FIFA World Cup. While, in December 2018, there are only a
few amounts of sports betting Apps filtered by our detectors.
The comparative analysis validates the observation from
the previous works and our intuition in designing features
discriminating the second download fraud type. It also gives
us hints on mitigating such type of download fraud which is
discussed in the following section.
V. RQ3: STANCES AND SUGGESTIONS
There are in total of three parties involved in the attack and
defense campaign of download fraud. App marketers have the
demand in fake downloads, fraudster agencies can arrange to
inject fake downloads to satisfy such demands, and app market
operators suffer from the generated fake downloads. In this
section, we first present the stances of three parties probed by
us, which help us understand why fake downloads flood in the
App markets. Then, we provide suggestions for App market
operators on how to mitigate download fraud activities and
foster a better App market ecosystem.
A. Stances of Three Parties
1) App Marketer: For App marketers, we are more inter-
ested in why they purchase fake downloads from download
agencies instead of promoting their Apps via advertising on
the App market. We interview four anonymous App marketers
who have purchased the fake downloads. They indicate that
not all Apps are eligible to advertise on the App market;
purchasing fake downloads has less cost than advertising
which only brings a slightly better effect.
2https://trends.google.com
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Fig. 4: Characteristics of suspicious Apps and downloads comparing with normal Apps and downloads. (a) App category
distribution of suspicious Apps versus normal Apps; (b) rating distribution of suspicious Apps versus normal Apps; (c)
suspicious downloads traffic versus normal downloads traffic in a day.
For the crowdturfing fraud, App marketers sometimes use
fabricated user acquisition statistics generated by crowdturfing
to meet the KPI and cheat the investors. Though legitimate
advertisement has a relatively lower cost, it has a more variable
conversion rate compared with directly hiring crowd workers
to complete elaborate tasks devised by marketers.
2) Fraudster Agency: Fraudster agencies provide various
kinds of services related to App promotion, and most of them
are irregular. For the first type of download fraud, fraudster
agencies list different prices for different App markets. It
suggests that different App markets have different levels of
anti-fraud approaches.
Some fraudster agencies offer an App promotion service
bundle called App Store Optimization (ASO). They devise a
personalized optimization plan based on the current operation
status of an App. ASO is a joint venture between fraudster
agencies and App marketers. Such type of service could
bring stable cash flow to fraudster agencies and preserve
considerable statistics of Apps. We also find some fraudster
agencies operate like legitimate IT companies. It illustrates
that most of today’s download fraud activities become a part
of an App’s regular promotion tactics.
3) Market Operator: We interview two anonymous opera-
tors from non-vendor Android App markets. They claim that
the continually evolving fraudsters can easily evade rule-based
filtering methods. Fixed thresholds of filtering rules usually
result in a high false negative rate, since they only model
partial aspects of fraud activities. The market operators only
focus on the techniques to filter fraud activities, but seldom
think about the way to mitigate fraud activities according to
their intentions.
It is worth noting that the interviewees deem that, in
some ways, the fake downloads are not 100% negative. They
consider a proper amount of fake downloads would make
the App markets thriving and motivate the users’ interests in
downloading Apps.
B. Suggestions for Market Operators
According to our previous analysis, we propose five sug-
gestions from A to E on mitigating download fraud for App
market operators and other social platforms suffering from
similar fraud activities.
• Adapting the agility of fraudsters. Due to the con-
tinually evolving fraud techniques in the wild, it is
better to design an effective and efficient detector, which
could detect fraud activities in real time and filter fake
downloads immediately. Unsupervised anomaly detection
model plus human inspection is a feasible solution in
practice. Together with fixing the security breach of the
App market system, these approaches will enhance the
robustness of the App market ecosystem and reduce its
vulnerability as well.
• Building behavior signature database. Our analysis
results in previous sections manifest that most of the
fraudsters adopt device ID and IP address resetting
techniques during injecting fake downloads. Plus the
prevalence of cloud services and IPv6 protocols, IP&ID
blacklisting is no more a valid method to filter bots and
fake devices. We also show that rule-based algorithms are
vulnerable to attacks. The market operators need to build
and update their behavior signature databases, which store
the verified suspicious behavior patterns.
• Crafting diversified anti-fraud mechanism. Our inves-
tigation in this work reveals the sophisticated intentions
behind download fraud campaigns. Beyond this, there are
many external factors causing abnormal traffics. There-
fore, the anti-fraud system should consider the motivation
of app marketers soliciting fake downloads from multiple
views. For different fraud type, a personalized detector
would capture more fraud activities and reduce the false
positive rate.
• Devising fine-grained advertisement services. A rea-
sonable App promotion mechanism and advertisement
bidding system will attract more App marketers to choose
legitimate promotion channels instead of cheating. For
example, multi-layered and personalized advertisement
pricing would provide more choices for App marketers.
Designing better user-advertisement interaction based
mechanism could increase the click-through rate (CTR)
of advertisement and redirect customers from fraudsters
to App market advertising system at the same time.
• Elaborating clear incentives and sanctions. A strict
examination of Apps before they released on App markets
could reduce the number of low-quality Apps along with
potential fraud activities. Demote the Apps with deceptive
activities according to their threat level. It will increase
the cost of cheating and thus lower the probability of
fraud. It also follows that the proper incentives will divert
more app marketers to legitimate promotion channels.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we track download fraud activities by setting a
honeypot App. We categorize and characterize download fraud
activities based on a large scale industrial dataset. With the
device vendor flag as ground truth, we further propose and
validate several features in identifying bot-generated down-
loads. By investigating the stances of three parties involved
in download fraud, we provide a couple of suggestions for
App market operators on how to mitigate download fraud and
foster a better ecosystem.
Though vendor flag is considered a valid ground truth to
help us dissect the download fraud activities, not all down-
load fraud activities are guaranteed to be found since some
advanced download bots may simulate the vendors’ devices.
Another limitation of our work is that we only investigate
download fraud activities in one App market. Some features
of the download fraud in other App markets may be different
from ours, but the cheating approaches and their intentions
should be similar. Moreover, other ensemble classifiers and
deep learning models may outperform XGBoost under a new
App market, which need to be tested in the future.
We investigate several ways to identify crowdturfing fraud
from the server-side log, but could not find clear evidence.
However, crowdturfing activities do exist in App markets
according to the black market. To identify such crowd work-
ers, a well-annotated dataset with more post-install behavior
information needs to be further examined. Fighting fraudsters
is a running battle; those selected features may be noneffective
after fraudsters camouflage themselves. Thus, devising robust
and dynamic countermeasures against fraudsters is another
avenue of future research.
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